By Cyril Anderson

 Part One of Two

One controversial issue regarding Islam is the issue of apostasy, the leaving of Islam by one who previously followed it.  This issue has become rather infamous in relation to a number of well-publicized cases, such as that of Salman Rushdie. The traditional opinion of most scholars over the centuries has been that in the most serious cases, the maximum punishment for apostasy is death.

 According to these traditional opinions from scholars, there are many restrictions on when this maximum sentence is supposedly allowed, on when it can be carried out and where, on the need for a trial, on the distinctions between milli (one who converts to Islam and then apostatizes) and fitri (one who is born into a Muslim household and raised in Islam and who then apostatizes) apostates, and the difference between simple apostasy and an active turning against Islam.  The conclusions on this are reached primarily from oral traditions which, according to these scholars, supposedly support a death sentence. 

 There are however a number of criticisms being raised regarding these traditions, in terms of the historical context of the incidents mentioned in the traditions and limits of application of these precedents to today’s world.  One important point which should be noted is that simple apostasy in which person leaves the religion quietly is not considered punishable based on traditions, according to scholars.  This suggests that historical precedents may have been misunderstood, with the punishments in these historical incidents actually being originally for “aiding the enemy” or similar charges.  This was after all a time when the religious decision of joining the Muslim community was also, due to severe persecution and the hostility of the leaders of Mecca, a decidedly political decision.  At that time, abandoning Islam was synonymous with an abandoning of a state and a joining with its enemies, a very extreme situation that is not closely analogous to that we see today.

 Despite this, one of the arguments traditionally and more recently given to justify a death penalty for apostasy is an argument based on an analogy with the concept of treason from a state.¹  Using this analogy, it is argued that as people were executed in non-Islamic nations for treason against the state up until very recently even in the US and Canada, and given that Islam is the state religion in the Islamic state, then it follows that open and vocal rejection of Islam is a rejection of the state, and thus equivalent to treason.

 On these lines, many Muslim thinkers of late have tried to rationalize a death penalty for those who leave Islam, announce this leaving publicly, and then proceed to work against the religion.  They argue that the real crime that is punishable is treason against the Islamic state, with such aggressive stances against their native religion falling under this umbrella as a category of treason.  Simple apostasy, as the argument goes, that is, leaving Islam quietly without a fuss and keeping to oneself afterwards, is not a punishable offence.
This argument from treason seems to rest on the assumption that the individual is living in an Islamic state where the people have consciously and freely chosen to be governed by Islamic law and principles.  

The idea of a death penalty for treason is one that is plausible for most people, even if they might not agree personally. That is, although they might not agree themselves, they will acknowledge that a country could make a case for it, given an appropriate definition of "treason." The trouble, however, is the notion that publicly leaving Islam and merely speaking against it, without taking arms against the state or helping those who do take up arms or stir sedition counts as apostasy. This is where those who want to make the argument need to work harder, if they in fact have a case to make.
The main problem I see with this liberal definition of treason, is that it fails to make a proper distinction between Islam as a religion and Islamic principles of government. Although the latter stems from the former, they are distinct concepts.

Islam is a source of noble principles of good government, such as the need to work for justice, the idea that a government must work to encourage the welfare of the people and protect the weak and enable a good life for the people, and the idea that people should be able to speak freely. These are just a few Islamic principles of government; there are many others. Although these principles of government are inspired by the religion of Islam, it is not the religion itself which forms the constitution of the Islamic government; rather, it is the Islamic principles of good governance.

Those who argue that leaving the Islamic religion and speaking out against this religion are treason against the Islamic state seem to be arguing that these actions actively undermine the constitution of the Islamic state. Such active undermining of the state's constitution is perhaps the most general, broadest definition of the concept of "treason."

The problem however, is that the Islamic state is constituted, as stated earlier, on Islamically inspired principles of government rather than on the religion of Islam itself. For example, according to Islam, good government is not based on believing in the Qu'ran as God's word or in believing in Muhammad as the last messenger of God, or in fasting in the month of Ramadan, although these are essential to the religion of Islam. Rather, good government, according to Islam, rests on certain overarching principles of how the government should best relate to its people, and how the government should best manage the relations between citizens.

¹ See, for example, Muhammad Rizvi's Apostasy in Islam (Irtidad) for a recent example of an article promoting this viewpoint.

                                     Part One              Part Two